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I. INTRODUCTION

Over their long history, the mail and wire fraud statutes have gone through
repeated periods of rapid expansion and contraction. The 1970s saw the flowering
of the "intangible rights doctrine," an exotic flower that quickly overgrew the
legal landscape in the manner of the kudzu vine until by the mid- 1980s few ethical
or fiduciary breaches seemed beyond its potential reach.' That doctrine was
01998 by John C. Coffee, Jr.
* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School
1. For probably the first suggestion that mail and wire fraud statutes were being utilized to support a general
federal common law of fiduciary duty and ethical impropriety, see John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some
Reflections on the Criminalizationof FiduciaryBreaches and the ProblematicLine Between Law and Ethics, 19
Am.CiRu. L. REv. 117 (1981).
It is obligatory that all articles on mail fraud begin with a citation to Jed Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud
Statute (Part1), 18 DUQ. L. REv.771 (1980), which is the definitive treatment of the mail fraud statute's early
history. As another prefatory matter, it should be understood that this article will generally not distinguish between
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radically pruned by the Supreme Court in 1987 in the McNally decision, 2 which
held that the federal mail and wire fraud statutes reached only those schemes that
intentionally sought to deprive their victims of money or property, but not schemes
seeking to deprive them merely of intangible rights. But McNally failed to drive a

stake through the heart of the doctrine. Later that same year, the Court decided that
the same statutes did protect victims from schemes to deprive them of intangible
property rights.3 Then, in 1988 Congress seemingly restored the intangible rights
doctrine to its previous full scope by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1346, 4 which broadly
defined the critical term "scheme to defraud" (which appears in both the mail and
wire fraud statutes) so that it expressly "includes a scheme or artifice to deprive
another of the intangible right of honest services." Clearly intended to reverse
McNally, this statute seemed to give congressional blessing to a body of law that,
prior to McNally, had amounted in substance to a judicially created federal

common law crime. For some, this re-enactment ended the debate and implied that
federal courts now had the power to determine on an ad hoc basis when conduct so
transgressed contemporary moral standards as to amount to a federal crime.5 In truth, however, the ebb and flow in the scope of the federal fraud statutes did

not stop with the passage of § 1346 in 1988. Rather, by a variety of techniques,
federal courts have steadily chipped away at the expansive reach of § 1346.
Contemporaneously, a majority of the Supreme Court (albeit a slim majority) has
suggested that it intends to limit national authority in favor of enhanced state and
local power. Most notably, in United States v. Lopez,6 for the first time in sixty

years,7 the Court discovered that Congress had exceeded the constitutional limits
on the scope of the Commerce Clause, which limits required the invalidation of the

the mail fraud statute (18 U.S.C. § 1341) and the federal wire fraud statute (18 U.S.C. § 1343) because for
purposes of the underlying conduct that violates these statutes (as opposed to the jurisdictional means) courts have
treated them equivalently. But see infra note 10 with regard to the different constitutional status of these two
statutes.
2. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
3. In Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), the Court held that an employer has a property right in
keeping confidential and making exclusive use of the content of newspaper columns written by its employee. The
decision says little about the source of this property right, but primarily cites prior federal decisions. Id. at 25
(citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), and Board of
Trade v. Christine Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905)). One New York decision, Diamondv. Oreamuno, 248
N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969), is cited with regard to the fiduciary duty owed by an agent or employee to the principal or
employer, but the court's declaration that the employer possessed a recognized property right that was infringed
seems to rest on federal common law.
4. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690, Title VII, § 7603(a), 102 Stat. 4181,4508.
5. For a pessimistic (and premature) assessment that § 1346 "left to the discretion of federal prosecutors the
power to decide what constitutes good government and criminal business practices," see Gregory Howard
Williams, Good Government by ProsecutorialDecree: The Use andAbuse of Mail Fraud,32 Aiuz. L. REV. 137,
138 n.7 (1990).
6. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
7. See Jan Crawford Greenberg, Lopez Case Ignites Debate on Congress s Law-Passing Limits, Cm. Thi.,
Jan. 4, 1996 at 3.
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Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.8 In so doing, it noted that "under our federal
system, the 'states possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the
criminal law.' "9 Although the federal mail fraud statute rests on a different
constitutional foundation from the Commerce Clause,"0 a Court unwilling to
permit Congress to protect school children from guns at the cost of invading the
realm of state authority might also discover internal (and external) limits on the
scope of Congress's authority under the postal power. Several recent commentators have made this argument," focusing particularly on the prevalence of the use
of mail and wire fraud to prosecute state and local officials in public corruption and
conflict of interest cases.12 From a "Neo-Federalist" or "dual sovereignty"
perspective, the use of a federal statute to reshape the structure of state governance

may be thought to upset the "healthy balance" that Lopez said it sought to
maintain between the states and the federal government.13
Although this prophecy that the Supreme Court will curb the federal fraud
statutes may yet prove accurate, that is not the direction in which the lower federal
courts have been moving. Rather, their concern, as later discussed, has been less

8. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994). It is customary to distinguish between "internal" and "external" constitutional
limits on the exercise of a power constitutionally accorded to the federal government. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET
AL., CoNsTrrTtoNAL LAW 182-89 (3d ed. 1996); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HARv. L. REv. 79, 105-06 (1995). "External limits" are constraints that have
their source in some provision or principle of the Constitution different than the power that Congress seeks to
exercise. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). In contrast, Lopez was an "internal limits" case,
because the Court believed that the constitutional power delegated to Congress under the Commerce Clause did
not extend to the point necessary to justify the national prohibition on guns in school zones there at issue. To date,
the Court has placed neither external nor internal limits on the postal power, which is the source of authority for
the mail fraud (but not the wire fraud) statute. See infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
9. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)).
10. Here, a distinction needs to be recognized between the mail and wire fraud statutes. The latter cannot rest
on the postal power and so is subject in theory to the same internal limits on the Commerce Clause as Lopez
stressed. In addition, the mail fraud statute was amended in 1994 to reach private mailings (i.e., Federal Express,
DHL, etc.). See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title XXV,
§ 250006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2087. For a discussion of this amendment, see Peter Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be
Called Federal Fraud: The Changing Nature of the Mail FraudStatute, 36 B.C. L. REv. 435 (1995). Although
private mailings are now expressly covered, congressional authority to reach these private entrepreneurial
services presumably rests upon the Commerce Clause. Nonetheless, some courts have rejected-perhaps too
quickly-the argument that Lopez has any significance for mail fraud prosecutions, because the mail fraud statute
rests on the postal power. See United States v. Elliott, 89 F.3d 1360, 1363-64 (8th Cir. 1996).
11. See George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption?-MailFraud,State Law and Post-Lopez
Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 225 (1997); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights
Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153 (1994). Both these highly intelligent articles
were written before the Supreme Court's decisions in Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666 (1997), and Salinas v.
United States, 118 S. Ct. 469 (1997).
12. That prosecutors place extensive reliance on the mail and wire fraud statutes in public corruption cases has
been amply documented by others. See Moohr, supra note 11, at 154 & n.6 (noting that as of December 31, 1990,
some 1561 state and local officials then awaited trial, with mail and wire fraud being the primary charges
employed in these cases).
13. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
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with the public corruption cases (which seem seldom to be overturned' 4) than with
the private fiduciary cases (where convictions have been regularly overturned)., 5
Only in this latter context have federal appellate courts regularly found that the
federal fraud statutes were being overextended. Unnoticed by recent commentators, the ironic fact is that federal courts have proven much less willing to tolerate
the criminalization of relatively minor transgressions in the private cQntext than
they have in the public context. 16
This dissonance between academic theory and actual practice is striking. What
has proven disturbing to appellate courts is not that a local politician has been
prosecuted for the undisclosed receipt of gratuities, but that federal prosecutors
have sought to expand the scope of the intangible rights doctrine against private
persons by propounding open-ended theories of the scope of § 1346's "right to
honest services." Unanchored in any recognizable source of federal, state, or
common law, the potential reach of § 1346 has troubled courts and has now been
curbed by a string of appellate defeats for the government. Yet, no consistent
rationale or clear doctrinal lines emerge from all these decisions taken together.
Rather, these are cases still searching in a Pirandello-like fashion for a plot. This
Article considers several possibly unifying themes and then recommends one that
distinguishes sharply between the public and private contexts.
This Article will make positive, normative, and predictive claims about the
recent trends in the mail fraud case law, which arguments will be developed in
several distinct stages. Section II will examine the development of the intangible
rights doctrine before and after the McNally decision and the passage of § 1346. In
particular, it will examine several recent federal appellate decisions that have
reversed mail and wire fraud convictions because the courts concluded that the
underlying conduct did not deprive any victim of a right to honest services (even
though this same conduct might have been found to have violated the mail and
wire fraud statutes in the years before McNally). Section III will examine the
doctrinal options available to a court that wishes to curb the reach of the mail and
wire fraud statutes to avoid overcriminalization. Section IV will recommend and
apply a suggested standard under which, in a private fiduciary case, the deprivation
of "honest services" must be actionable (although not necessarily criminal) under
14. See infra notes 100-30 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 44-99 and accompanying text. This Article will recurrently distinguish between "public
fiduciary" cases and "private fiduciary" cases. It is therefore important to understand that "public fiduciary"

cases include prosecutions of private citizens who have sought to bribe or wrongfully influence public officials
and employees. See, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 85 F3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996) (prosecution of lobbyist for
providing small gratuities to state legislators). Correspondingly, "private fiduciary" cases also include the party
offering a bribe or undisclosed side payment and are not limited to persons occupying a formal fiduciary

relationship, but include any person occupying a position of trust and confidence that gives rise to a legal duty.
16. Compare United States v. Jain, 93 F.2d 436 (8th Cir. 1996) (mail fraud does not reach receipt of side
payments of gratuities by a private fiduciary) with United States v. Espy, Crim.A. No. 97-0335 (RMU), 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20772, at * 12, 1997 WL 795807, at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 1997) (receipt of gratuities by Secretary of
Agriculture within scope of mail fraud).
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applicable state law or an independent federal statute. The basic doctrinal justification for such a limiting standard is that courts today may not look to federal
common law in order to explicate an ambiguous concept (such as "right to honest
services")--except when congressional intent is clear to recast the balance of
federal/state authority. In particular, resort to federal law is disfavored when state
legal standards already apply to the same actors. Finally, Section IV will argue that
important policy justifications support interpreting and applying the mail and wire
fraud statutes more aggressively in the public context than in the private context.
This Article's central doctrinal claim that the "right to honest services" under
§ 1346 should be defined by state law or an independent federal statute has been
suggested by others, but faces a doctrinal obstacle in that several cases have
already held that the term is to be defined by federal common law. 17 This Article
will suggest that these cases need to be (and can be) reinterpreted. At least since
Atherton v. FDIC,18 it now seems clear that federal common law will rarely be
permitted by the Supreme Court to supply the applicable rule of decision.
Although the legislative history of § 1346 can be read to express an intent to
endorse a federal common law rule, this Article will suggest that this intent is
limited to the public fiduciary context. In the floor debate leading up to the
enactment of § 1346, the most ardent congressional champions of overruling
McNally focused exclusively on the public fiduciary context and endorsed the then
embryonic concept that the Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution
gave Congress the constitutional authority to regulate state and local corruption.' 9
At the time, this was a novel idea that had just been articulated in an about-to-be
published law review article that they cited. 20 Although it is very debatable indeed
whether § 1346 can or should rest on a Guarantee Clause foundation, Congress did
make a "clear statement" in § 1346 that it intended to assert federal authority
within the public fiduciary context. At present, unless the tide of Neo-Federalism
advances still further, this is sufficient to establish federal authority. Thus, it
follows that § 1346 should be construed according to federal common law, to the
extent necessary to understand and implement this rationale. But this rationale
requires that we look to federal common law standard only in the case of public
fiduciaries. Whether one accepts or rejects the Guarantee Clause thesis, the
legislative history still only supports use of federal common law to the extent
necessary to purge public corruption.
The point then is that federal common law should override state law in the
judicial construction of § 1346 only to the extent necessary to protect the special
17. See United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 366 (6th Cir. 1997); Morda v. Klein, 865 F.2d 782 (6th Cir. 1989).
18.

117 S. Ct. 666 (1997).

19. See Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that "the United States shall guarantee to
The legislative history of § 1346 is reviewed
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government ...
infra, text and notes at notes 166-80.
20. See Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for FederalProsecutions of State and Local
Officials, 62 S. CALIF. L. REV. 367 (1989).
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rights that Congress saw as falling within the Guarantee Clause's protections.
Here, that means that the citizenry's right to be protected from public corruption
stands on higher ground and can receive a more liberal interpretation. But outside
this sphere, the normal principles of statutory construction require the court to look
to state law. 2 t This is particularly true in connection with the determination of the
duties owed by agents, employees, officers, and directors, because the Supreme
Court has recurrently stressed that the governance of business organizations is to
be determined by state law-unless Congress has clearly and explicitly said
otherwise.2 2

In short, this Article's thesis is that § 1346 should be construed according to state
law in the case of private fiduciaries, but according to federal common law in the
case of public fiduciaries. This is both a positive and a normative claim, as this
Article will also argue that such a differential makes sense in terms of the criminal

law's traditional concerns about fair notice, selective enforcement, and the
separation of powers.
II.

THE TRENDS IN THE CASE LAW

Other articles (including by this author) have traced the rise of the "intangible
rights" doctrine in both the public and private sectors. For purposes of this survey,
it is necessary only to identify the high water mark of that doctrine in order to have
a convenient point of comparison against which to measure the recent cases.
A. The Flood Tide of Intangible Rights: The Pre-McNally Case Law
Two well-known cases, each in the Second Circuit, show the flood tide at its
crest: (1) in the private sector, United States v. Bronston, 3 and (2) in the public
sector, United States v. Margiotta.24 Notably, each decision was also accompanied
by a persuasive dissent. .
1. The Private Sector: United States v. Bronston
In Bronston, the defendant was both a state Senator and a partner at a prominent
New York law firm. His law firm had recently represented the minority investors
21. In Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666 (1997), the Court reversed a Third Circuit opinion that had looked to
federal common law to set the standards under a federal statute (12 U.S.C. § 1821(k)) which held directors of
federally insured banks personally liable "for gross negligence [or] similar conduct ,.. that demonstrates a
greater disregard of a duty" (than gross negligence). Holding that state law governs, the Court broadly implied
that federal common law is today disfavored. In particular, arguments about the need for uniform standards
justifying a federal rule were expressly rejected. See also O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
22. See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991); Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg,
501 U.S. 1083 (1991); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Daily Income Fund, Inc. v.
Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
23. 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981).
24. 688 F.2d 108 (2dCir. 1982).
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in Bus Top Shelters, Inc. ("Bus Top") in the private placement transaction by
which the investors had acquired their interests in Bus Top, but the law firm did not
otherwise represent Bus Top. As its name suggests, Bus Top held an interim
franchise from the City of New York to build and maintain bus shelters. A personal
client of Bronston's approached him to represent a rival contender for that
franchise, which the client controlled. Bronston asked his firm to take on the
representation of this rival contender, Convenience and Safety Corp. ("C&S"),
but the firm declined because of its prior representation of the minority investors in
Bus Top. Nonetheless, Bronston secretly undertook to advise his client and C&S
on a personal basis, working on C&S's bidding and public relations strategy,
attending meetings, commenting on draft letters sent by C&S to city officials, and
ultimately billing C&S some $12,500 for these efforts (which fee he never shared
with his law partners). In addition, whether in his capacity as a state senator or as
C&S's attorney, he sent a letter on his official stationery as a state senator to an
official in the City Comptroller's office, which argued that "a renewal of [Bus
Top's] franchise would not appear to be in the public interest.' 25 Although
Bronston was privy to information about Bus Top's own bidding strategy, no
evidence was presented at trial that he had misappropriated confidential information from Bus Top and communicated it to C&S or others.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court's charge to the jury focused only on
Bronston's breach of duty to the Bus Top investors. The court charged the jury that:
a lawyer.., owes a duty... to the clients of his law firm to act with the utmost
good faith and loyalty toward the firm's clients and to fully disclose any
participation in a conflicting relationship with ... mutually exclusive business
interests of a competitor of the firm's clients which would in any way injure,
impair, interfere with or frustrate the business interests of the client in order to
promote the mutually exclusive interests of the competitor.2 6
Read literally, this charge seemingly criminalizes ever representing clients whose
interests conflict. For example, if Bronston were a tax lawyer who provided clever
(or even pedestrian) tax advice to two competitors, it could be argued that
assistance to one side necessarily hurt the other. Moreover, the facts of Bronston
suggest that even a lack of candor or good faith to a former client, which had been

represented only in a one-shot transaction, also violates the federal fraud statutes.
More importantly, Bronston's defense that it was necessary to show some use of
the defendant's fiduciary position to establish liability was rejected by both the
District Court and the Second Circuit. In United States v. Dixon,27 Judge Henry
Friendly had earlier found that "a scheme to use a private fiduciary position to

25. Bronston, 658 F.2d at 925.
26. The charge to the jury in Bronston is quoted in Coffee, supra note I, at 131-32.
27. 536 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976).
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obtain direct pecuniary gain is within the mail fraud statute, ' 28 but then noted that
"an effort to avoid disclosure, although a breach of a statutory obligation, was
hardly a 'scheme or artifice to defraud.' ,29 Missing was the element of actual or
intended harm to the fiduciary. Bronston seemed implicitly to overrule Dixon's
requirement of actual or intended harm, because the evidence in Bronston showed
only the fact of a knowing conflict, not any use of fiduciary position or unfair
self-dealing (such as a fiduciary transacting business on unfair terms with a client
or beneficiary). Bronston thus crossed a critical threshold: before it, cases in which
there was only a conflict of interests, but neither a transaction between the
fiduciary and the client nor any misappropriation of information or property by the
fiduciary from the client, had been considered merely "constructive fraud," which
did not amount to the type of "actual fraud" that transgressed the federal mail and
wire fraud statutes.30
After Bronston, cases in the Second Circuit quickly expanded the category of
fraud to include corporate improprieties that were actually intended to benefit
shareholders. For example, in United States v. Weiss, 3 1 a mid-level corporate
officer at Warner Communications, Inc. arranged, with the knowledge and consent
of his superiors, to create an off-books cash slush fund, which was then used to
fund "illicit cash rebates" and for other unstated purposes. 32 No evidence
suggested that "cash was misappropriated from Warner, 33 and the defendant
acted pursuant to instructions from corporate superiors. One surmises that the
slush fund may have been used for improper purposes but still in order to
maximize shareholder wealth. Nonetheless, citing Bronston and its progeny, the
Second Circuit said that "the statute is violated when a fiduciary fails to disclose
material information 'which he is under a duty to disclose to another under
circumstances where the non-disclosure could or does result in harm to another.' "34 In the panel's view, disclosure had to be made to the shareholders, even
though the size of the fund was seemingly immaterial to Warner. This clearly
reversed Dixon's earlier emphasis on actual harm or injury. As Judge Ralph Winter
has observed in a dissent, this creates a new crime: corporate improprieties.35
The bottom of this slippery slope was probably reached with United States v.
Wallach,3 6 in which the principal defendant was convicted of mail fraud for billing
28. Id. at 1399 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 1400.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Rabbit, 583 F.2d 1014, 1024-25 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. McNieve, 536
F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1976); Epstein v. United States, 174 F2d 754, 766 (6th Cir. 1945).
31. 752 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1983).
32. Weiss, 752 F.2d at 781.
33. Id. at 783.
34. Id. at 784 (citing Siegel, 717 F.2d at 14).
35. See Siegel, 717 F.2d at 24 (Winter, J., dissenting) ("In effect, a new crime--corporate improprietieswhich entails neither fraud nor even a victim, has been created.").
36. 935 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1991). The conviction was, however, reversed because of perjured testimony and the

prosecution's failure to respond to it.
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a corporate client for legal work in connection with a public offering of securities
(when in fact the work was for lobbying efforts on the company's behalf). This
format was requested by the company (which knew full well the nature of the work
Wallach had performed on its behalf). Nonetheless, the Second Circuit sustained
the prosecution's novel theory that this mischaracterization of the bill deprived the
company shareholders of their "intangible 'right to control' how [the company's]
money was spent."-37 As the Second Circuit panel in Wallach saw it:
A stockholder's right to monitor and to police the behavior of the corporation
and its officers is clearly a property interest ....Indeed ...the right to
complete and accurate information is one of the most essential38 sticks in the
bundle of rights that comprise a stockholder's property interest.
Clearly, this statement was an imaginative construct of federal common law, as
state law did not provide shareholders with any informational rights that entitled
them to receive, or have access to, such records; nor do the federal securities laws
generally entitle them to disclosure about immaterial corporate expenditures. 39
So construed, federal mail fraud became a crime without a clear victim. Even
collective self-deceit became arguably a federal crime.
2. The Public Fiduciary:United States v. Margiotta4°
Joseph Margiotta was not in any standard sense a public official. Rather, he was
the Chairman of the Republican Committees of both Nassau County and the Town
of Hempstead. 4 ' As such, he was the classic political boss. In. that role, he
continued a patronage system, begun by his predecessors (in both parties),
whereby an insurance broker would be designated "broker of record" for Nassau
County and in return would rebate fifty percent of its commissions on countyrelated business to brokers and others politically allied with Mr. Margiotta.
Although Mr. Margiotta himself received some of these apparent kickbacks,
neither self-dealing nor personal profit were necessary elements of the government's legal theory. Rather, the government alleged that Margiotta deprived the
citizens of Nassau County "(1) of the right to have the affairs of the Town, County
and State conducted honestly, free from corruption, fraud and dishonesty, and (2)
of the right to Margiotta's honest and faithful participation in the governmental
affairs of the Town, County, and State.", 42 Under this broader theory, the failure to

37. Id. at 461.
38. Id. at 463.
39. On somewhat different facts, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(l), (g)-(h),
78dd-1 to 78dd-2, 78ff(a) (1994), might well be violated by a false billing scheme, but this statute does not itself
require disclosure to shareholders.
40. 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982).

41. Id. at 112.
42. Id. at 114.
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disclose a political motive for governmental actions, or indeed any "participation
in governmental affairs" for undisclosed self-interested reasons, could be deemed
a violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, even in the absence of any illicit
profits or personal gain.
The overreach in this theory seems obvious and invades even the sphere of the
First Amendment. For example, Presidents regularly appoint large campaign
donors to ambassadorships to small countries, proclaiming them the "best man for
the job" (while clearly knowing otherwise). Although common, such an affirmative misrepresentation actually goes beyond Mr. Margiotta's simple failure to
disclose his similar motive to obtain campaign funds. At the time, Margiotta
chiefly attracted notice because it extended the "intangible rights" doctrine from
an elected or appointed official to a person holding de facto control over public
officials. Less noticed was the fact that the decision at least purported to look to
New York State law, not federal common law, in determining that defendant
Margiotta was fiduciary to the citizens of his jurisdiction.43
In any event, five years after Margiotta,the McNally case involved essentially
similar facts and a similar theory-and was decisively rejected by the Supreme
Court. Shortly thereafter, § 1346 was enacted, setting the stage for the subsequent
judicial developments discussed below.
B. The New Case Law on Private Fiduciaries

The recent decision that most clearly draws a line between public and private
fiduciaries is United States v. Frost.4" The facts in Frost involve a diploma mill.
Defendant Frost was both the Chairman of the Department of Engineering Science
and Mechanics at a University of Tennessee campus and also the owner and
president of a private science research firm.45 Several of Dr. Frost's graduate
students worked for NASA or the Department of Defense and were in a position to
exercise influence over the awarding of research contracts. The government
alleged, and the jury agreed, that Dr. Frost and his co-defendants developed and
pursued a "degrees for contracts" scheme pursuant to which they enabled certain
students to obtain graduate degrees "through significant plagiarism and with a
minimum of effort."'4 6 In return, each student defendant allegedly "would abuse
his or her position with the government to secure ...lucrative government
research contracts" for Frost's research firm.47 In its indictment, the government
43. There is some irony in this point, because the Second Circuit borrowed several decisions from a string

citation of cases in an article that this author had written after the district court decision that criticized that holding.
These cases were cited to suggest how ineffably broad the common law rule was. Nonetheless, the Second Circuit
panel cited them as the prevailing law. See id. at 125 (citing Coffee, supra note 1, at 147).
44. 125 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 1997).
45. Id. at 352.
46. Id. at 353.
47. Id.
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characterized this arrangement both as a scheme to defraud the federal government
(by the NASA and Defense employees who were Dr. Frost's students) and as a
scheme by Dr. Frost to defraud the University of Tennessee.
Reviewing the convictions, the Sixth Circuit split the difference, reversing the
convictions of the students (on the grounds that insufficient evidence showed that
they had caused the government to award contracts to Dr. Frost's firm), but
upholding the convictions of the professors for defrauding their University. Noting
that § 1346 was intended to reverse McNally48 and agreeing that § 1346 applied to
private fiduciaries,'4 9 the Sixth Circuit found that Frost and his co-employees had
breached a duty to the University of Tennessee by deceiving other' University
employees so as to cause the University to award undeserved academic degrees. 50
This conduct, it found, deprived the University of its intangible right to Frost's
honest services. Still, the Sixth Circuit sharply narrowed the standard applicable to
§ 1346 claims in the case of "non-public officials." 51 Merely depriving the private
fiduciary of the employee's honesty was insufficient. Rather, the prosecution must
prove "that the employee foresaw or reasonably should have foreseen that his
employer might suffer an economic harm as a result of the breach."51 2 In
formulating this standard, the Sixth Circuit principally relied upon a pre-§ 1346
District of Columbia Circuit case, United States v. Lemire,5 3 which framed the test
as whether "the defendant might reasonably have contemplated some concrete
business harm to his employer stemming from his failure to disclose the conflict
along with any other information relevant to the transaction.",5 4 In Lemire, the
defendant had participated in an outside joint venture, which resulted in a conflict
of interest in violation of the employer's express policies. Although the D.C.
Circuit upheld the conviction on its facts, it stressed that mere proof of the
employer's loss of loyalty or a fiduciary breach alone was insufficient.
The significance of Lemire lies largely in the fact that it was a pre-McNally case.
Because the D.C. Circuit decided Lemire at the point when the "intangible rights
doctrine" was at its fullest flowering, the case shows that even if § 1346 is deemed
simply to reverse McNally, it does not follow that there are no limits on the

restored intangible rights doctrine. Relying in part on an earlier article by this
author,5 6 Lemire drew an ends/means distinction: if the fiduciary breach was a

48. Id. at 364 (citing McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)).

49. Id. at 364-65.
50. Id. at 369.
51. Id. at 365-69.
52. Id. at 368. Whether the "reasonably should have foreseen" language impermissibly holds a defendant
criminally liable for negligence is a separate question and one not really present on the facts of Frost.
53. 720 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
54. Id. at 1337.
55. Id. at 1336-37.
56. Id. at 1336, n.10 (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing Story of the
'Evolution'ofaWhite CollarCrime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1983)).
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means to deprive the employer of some benefit or cause it some injury, then the
breach would violate the mail fraud statute, but not otherwise.5 7 But unless such an
end was contemplated, even "an intentional failure to disclose a conflict of
to defraud an
interest, without more, is not sufficient evidence of the intent
'' 8
employer necessary under the [mail and] wire fraud statutes. 1
Although both Frost and Lemire upheld the convictions on their facts, other
cases applying the same standard have reversed convictions. Recent appellate
cases include:
1. United States v. DeFries.59 Defendants were elected officials of a small union
of professionals (the Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association) that merged with a
larger, blue collar union (the National Maritime Union). Upon the merger's
effectiveness, the officials "received severance payments totaling almost $2
million, even though they immediately assumed roughly equivalent positions in
the newly merged union's leadership." 60 The severance plan was approved by the
old union's Executive Committee, which received the advice of highly competent
outside counsel. The indictment charged that the defendants took steps to conceal
from the union membership the adoption, terms, and triggering event of the
severance plan, such as not disclosing the plan in the minutes of the Committee's
meetings and by instructing others "not to reveal any details of the plan." 61
Following the plan's disclosure after the merger, there was substantial protest
within the union, and a contested election ensued at which insurgents unseated the
incumbents. According to the evidence at trial, the defendants took a number of
steps to resist their ouster over a series of union elections, including (1) soliciting
and collecting unmarked and unsealed ballots and voting them in favor of their
own interests, and (2) tampering with sealed ballots in order to stuff the ballot box.
The District of Columbia Circuit left no doubt that tampering with ballots or
"coercively" obtaining ballots from union members would constitute a deprivation of the defendants' "honest services" in violation of § 1346.62 But it drew the
line at the trial court's instruction to the jury, which permitted the jury to consider
"soliciting and collecting unsealed ballots and voting them in favor of the
defendant's interests" as evidence of a scheme to defraud.6 3 Even though it found
that this activity violated both the union's constitution and by-laws and also the

57. Id.
58. Id. at 1337. Of course, this is also what Dixon held in the Second Circuit. See supra text and notes at notes
28-29.
59. 129 F.3d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
60. Id. at 1297.
61. Id. Interestingly, the facts of DeFriesin the labor context very much parallel the facts of United States v.
Dixon (discussed supra note 27) in the corporate context. Dixon inolved undisclosed loans to the CEO that the
board had approved and DeFriesinvolved undisclosed compensation that the union's executive committee had
approved. Both defendants won on appeal.
62. Id. at 1304-05.
63. Id. at 1305.
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civil provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, the
District of Columbia Circuit concluded that it did not "amount to a dishonest
service. ' ' 64 In short, the conduct was assumed to breach defendants' fiduciary
duties to union members, but this alone was not enough.65 Relying on Lemire and
Frost, it distinguished a fiduciary breach from active dishonesty (such as vote
tampering) and found the former insufficient where it threatened no loss or harm to
the union memebers. 6
2. United States v. Cochran.67 Defendant Cochran was the head of municipal
bond underwriting for a sizable broker-dealer firm. In connection with these
transactions in which his firm represented the municipal issuer, he received secret
side payments from financial institutions (in one case $489,241 and in another
$100,000). The government asserted that the relationship between the issuer and
the underwriter was a fiduciary one, thereby entailing a duty to disclose side
payments, but the Tenth Circuit panel responded that "the government could not
inform us of any statute, regulation, common law or contractual provision that
required disclosure of the fee." 68 Because the underwriting transaction had closed
before the secret fee was received (which was paid for services in investing the
bond proceeds with the financial institution that paid the fee), the Tenth Circuit
decision can be defended on the grounds that the two transactions were separable
and that Cochran was no longer acting as a fiduciary with regard to the latter
transaction. At the least, the decision shows how a court that is sympathetic to a
defendant can construe the scope of a fiduciary relationship parsimoniously. Still,
even in the absence of a fiduciary relationship, the Tenth Circuit recognized that a
misleading omission could be actionable as fraudulent, but only "if it is intended
to induce a false belief and resulting action to the advantage of the misleader and
the disadvantage of the misled.", 69 Although the basis for the Tenth Circuit's
resistance to the government's theory is not entirely clear, its core belief seems to
have been that the disclosure, even 7if0 legally required, would not have made a
difference because it was immaterial.

64. id.
65. Id. at 1305-06. Quoting United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the panel said the
breach of fiduciary duty must be " 'accompanied by a misrepresentation or non-disclosure that is intended or is
contemplated to deprive the person to whom the duty is owed of some legally significant benefit.' "Id. at 1306.
66. Id. at 1306 ("Even if it violates appellants' fiduciary obligations under federal law and union rules,
proxy-voting, so long as it is not done coercively or against the voters' wishes, is not necessarily 'dishonest.' ").

67. 109 F.3d 660 (10th Cir. 1997).
68. Id. at 665. The Court also noted the "lack of public or private regulation concerning reinvestment broker
fees during the pertinent time period," id., and characterized the governments disclosure theory as "standard-

less." Id. at 667.
69. Id. at 665 (quoting Emery v. American General Finance, Inc., 71 F.3d 1343, 1348 (7th Cir. 1995)).
70. The panel makes this clearest in its statement that a § 1346 prosecution requires a showing of "fraudulent
intent and a showing of materiality." Cochran, 109 F.3d at 667. A factual problem with this line of defense on the
facts of Cochran is that a representative of the issuer (Mr. Trent) testified at trial that he expected the underwriter
"to work for free on the reinvestment phase," Id. at 666.
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Although it is possible to read Cochran narrowly as saying that side payments
received after the main transaction has closed are immaterial, the decision is also
susceptible to a broader reading that so long as the parties have agreed to the terms
of a transaction, there is no harm in agents receiving additional fees from other
persons (at least absent special facts suggesting some unusual harm). As discussed
below, this broader interpretation would significantly cut back on the traditional
reach of the mail and wire fraud statutes.
3. United States v. Jain.7 ' The side payment issue is also at the core of the Jain
case, in which a psychologist and his personal corporation were convicted for
receiving payments from a psychiatric hospital for referring patients to that
hospital. Reversing the convictions, the Eighth Circuit found that the requisite
"scheme to defraud" did not exist where the doctor "provided quality psychologipatient required hospitalization.", 72 Thus, it
cal services" and "each hospitalized
' 73
found a lack of "tangible harm.
This theory that there was no tangible harm can easily be disputed. Perhaps if
the hospital had not paid a kickback to Dr. Jain, the hospital would have reduced its
charges to patients. It might have competed for the patients' business based on
price, rather than through covert payments to the patients' agent, the referring
doctor.
Underlying the Eighth Circuit's decision is a clear sense that § 1346 should not
be applied as strictly in the private sector as in the public sector. Conceding that the
"literal language of § 1346 extends to private sector schemes to defraud another of
the right to honest services," the panel still warned that "the transition from public
to private sector in this context raises troublesome issues."- 74 Without even a
reference to the legislative history of § 1346, the opinion then stressed the greater
injury "when official action is corrupted by secret bribes or kickbacks." 7 When

this happens, "the essence of the political contract is violated.", 7 6 But in the private
context, the court said that "most relationships are limited to more concrete
matters," and hence "actual harm to the victims' tangible interests" must be
shown.7 7 This comes perilously close to making a legislative judgment about the
need for a criminal prohibition. Still, as will be argued later, this may be
substantially the judgment that Congress itself made in enacting § 1346.
Yet, even if the private and public contexts should be sharply distinguished, it
does not necessarily follow that the line should be drawn at the point that Jain
draws it. Specifically, side payments do not merit general protection from the law
of fraud on the economically dubious rationale that no one was harmed. Indeed,
71.
72.
73.
74.

93 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 441.
id.
Id. at 441-42.

75. Id. at 442.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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one of the most traditional mail fraud prosecutions was that of the corporate
buying agent who receives a commercial bribe (or side payment) to buy the
product of Supplier A instead of that of Supplier B.7 Often, the two products were
priced exactly the same, and hence it might be said in Jain's language that there
was no "tangible harm" to the corporation. The practical advantage of the mail
fraud statute was that it spared prosecutors from having to prove financial injury by
allowing the prosecutor to focus instead on the breach of fiduciary duty. Although
both Cochran and Jain can be distinguished from the case of the corporate
employee who receives an undisclosed bribe to effect corporate decision-making,
they collectively cast a shadow over the continued ability of the mail fraud statute
to reach such side payment cases. Viewed in the aggregate, there is an economic
injury in such side payments and kickbacks because the supplier could have
alternatively competed for the same business by offering price discounts. Thus,
while Cochran and Jain properly emphasize the difference in contexts, it is not
clear that they are drawing the correct line in searching for proof of financial loss.
4. United States v. Walters. 79 Norby Walters was a sports agent who sought to
(and did) secure the business of some 58 college athletes while they were still
enrolled in school by advancing them money and other valuables in return for
signing exclusive agency contracts with him. This conduct was in flagrant defiance
of NCAA rules, and it caused several universities to pay scholarship funds to
athletes who had become ineligible as a result of his agency deals. Noting that
Walters' aim was to represent the athletes in legitimate transactions with professional sports teams, the Seventh Circuit found that this conduct did not amount to a
scheme to defraud where it only inflicted a loss on the universities as an
unintended (if perhaps foreseeable) by-product of his activities. 80 There is perhaps
some tension between Walters and Frost in that forfeited scholarships were not an
actionable loss in Walters, but illegitimate degrees were viewed as wrongfully
obtained property in Frost. Still the key difference is probably one of nexus: Frost
could only succeed by causing the university to issue degrees for bogus research,
while Walters had no desire to see the athletes rendered ineligible or their
scholarships invalidated. In any event, neither Walters nor the student athletes
owed a clear fiduciary duty to the universities involved, as neither were formal
employees or agents who would have owed a duty of honest services to the
victimized universities.
5. United States v. D'Amato.8 ' Armand D'Amato, the brother of the New York

Republican Senator, was convicted of seven counts of mail fraud essentially for
78. See, e.g., United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414, 422 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that defendant's failure to
disclose kickbacks and consulting fees from supplier resulted in breach of his fiduciary duties); United States v.
George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 1973) (determining that buyer defrauded his employer when he received
kickbacks from supplier).
79. 997 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1993).
80. Id. at 1227.
81. 39 F.3d 1249 (2dCir. 1994).
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disguising the nature of the services that he provided to Unisys Corporation. Hired
in fact as a lobbyist to influence his brother, he "structured his billings to conceal
from those in control of corporate funds the nature of his relationship with Unisys
and the fact that his actual services involved lobbying his brother." 82 The
government proceeded on two distinct legal theories: (1) the "right to control"
theory that his concealment deprived Unisys and its shareholders of their ability to
control corporate funds, and (2) a "false pretenses" theory under which D'Amato
knew that the written reports on Senate proceedings that he contracted to provide
(as a cover story for his billings) would never be provided in fact. 83 The Second
Circuit rejected both
theories on the ground that "the evidence of criminal intent
84
insufficient."
was
The "right to control" theory had previously been upheld in United States v.
Wallach8 5 and "is predicated on a showing that some person or entity has been
deprived of potentially valuable economic information."'8 6 The withholding of
such information is thus deemed fraudulent to the extent that it "could impact on
economic decisions.,' 87 The D'Amato panel re-interpreted this questionable extension of mail fraud to make it clear that it did not reach the case of "a corporate
agent who in good faith believes that his or her (otherwise legal) misleading or
inaccurate conduct is in the corporation's best interests." 88 As justification, it gave
obvious examples, such as an oil geologist who hides the location of his drilling
efforts or a takeover law firm that conceals its identity so as not to signal the
corporation's plans to make a takeover. 89 It also indicated the limitations on this
doctrine: namely (i) that management made an otherwise lawful decision, and (ii)
that it was acting "in good faith in making, and did not personally profit, from the
decision." 90
Interestingly, D'Amato was particularly clear that the "right to control" is
"defined by (i) state law concerning access to the company's books and records
and the fiduciary obligations of management and (ii) the law of fraud concerning
corporate information that is public." 9 ' Yet, the concept that the Second Circuit is
defining in D'Amato based on New York law is "property," not the "right to
honest services." This is because D'Amato is a pre-§ 1346 decision that did not
need to construe the "right to honest services." Although it can be argued that the
82. Id. at 1252.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 935 E2d 445 (2d Cir. 1991). Even before DAmato, the "right to control" theory had been limited in
United States v. Mittelstaedt, 31 F.3d 1208 (2d Cir. 1994), which essentially involved a public fiduciary and is
discussed infra at note 100.
86. Wallach, 935 F.2d at 462-63.
87. Id.
88. D'Amato, 39 E3d at 1257.
89. Id. at 1257 n.5, 1258.
90. Id. at 1258.
91. Id.
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"right to honest services" should be defined as a matter of federal common law,
this draws a senseless distinction between § 1341 (the mail fraud statute), which
uses the term "property" and § 1346, which indicates that a scheme to defraud can
include a deprivation of the "right to honest services." If one looks primarily to
state law to define "property," one arguably should similarly look there to
understand the "right to honest services."
6. United States v. Miller.92 Miller is another case involving a close and
parsimonious reading of the scope of the fiduciary duty, owed in this case by an
attorney to his clients. Although the principal defendant in this case was the
Speaker of the New York State Assembly, the government's allegations related
entirely to his private conduct representing investor clients in connection with the
conversion of a rent-controlled housing project into a cooperative. Having successfully represented the tenants in this conversion, defendant Miller was approached
by a group of sophisticated private investors to represent them in connection with
purchasing occupied units in the project. While representing these investors,
Miller also acquired units in the project, and the government alleged that Miller
and a co-defendant thereby "wrongfully seized for themselves an economic
benefit belonging to the [clients]." 93 In traditional fiduciary terms, this sounded
like a "corporate opportunity" case: the fiduciary acquired property in which the
principal to whom it owed the duty (i.e., the clients) had a tangible interest and
expectancy. The problem was that the relationship between attorney and client
was, according to the Second Circuit, "ill-defined at best."'94 The lead client in fact
testified that he had no expectation that Miller would not acquire apartments,
considered the transaction a "considerable success," and was. satisfied with the
defendant's representation. 95 Given the lack of any contractual agreement between
the attorney and his clients, the government was forced to rely on traditional New
York agency law that an agent "must account for any profits realized in connection
with his representation of the principal." 96 According to the government's theory,
this duty to account gave rise to a constructive trust that covered the apartment
units acquired by the defendants. 9 7 The Second Circuit rejected this theory, finding
that a constructive trust was a remedial concept, not a doctrine of substantive law,
and hence did not rise to the level of a "property interest" that was required under
McNally.

98

Because the conduct in Miller occurred prior to the passage of § 1346, it can be
92. 997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993). The author served as one of the attorneys to the defendants in this case. Id. at
1011.

93. Id. at 1017.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1015. This client also testified that "he would not have any problem retaining Miller to represent him
again." Id.

96. Id. at 1018.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1018-21 (citing McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)).
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argued that the outcome would have been reversed if § 1346 had been applicable. 99
But cases like Cochran and Jain suggest otherwise. Indeed, in stressing the
ambiguous relationship between the attorneys and their sophisticated clients, and
the fact that the clients were satisfied with the attorneys' services, the Second
Circuit left at least some room in a future case to find that a § 1346 violation would
not have been established on similar facts.
C. The New Case Law on Public Fiduciaries
The last three years have also witnessed important cases on public fiduciaries.' 0 0
0°
Of these, the two most important cases are United States v. Sawyer' and the Fifth
02
Collectively, these
Circuit's en banc decision in United States v. Brumley.

decisions resolve that, despite the claims of the Neo-Federalists that Congress
cannot regulate state governance, § 1346 may constitutionally be applied to
schemes by state or local governmental officials to deprive citizens of their honest
federal law or
services as public fiduciaries. 10 3 But they have not agreed whether
04

state law determines the scope of the right to honest services.'
In United States v. Sawyer, 0 5 the defendant was a lobbyist for the largest life

insurance company in Massachusetts. In that capacity, he regularly wined and
dined, and played countless rounds of golf with, the state legislators who served on
the Massachusetts Legislature's Joint Insurance Committee. 10 6 This conduct

violated two Massachusetts statutes: a "gift statute" that forbade gifts above $100

99. The decision suggests that there was a "generalized failure to accord the ... [clients] honest and faithful
services," but that this was not sufficient to satisfy McNally or constitute "property." Id. at 1020.
100. In addition to the cases discussed in the following text, two other reversals of convictions in cases
involving public fiduciaries merit notice. First, in United States v. Mittelstaedt, 31 F3d 1208 (2d Cir. 1994), the
Second Circuit reversed a conviction of a local planning board official who had an undisclosed interest in
applications that came before his board. The official had, however, little discretionary power and could not vote on
any application, and the relevant events largely predated the passage of § 1346.
Second, in a closer case, the First Circuit has also reversed a conviction for "honest services" fraud of an IRS
employee who conducted unauthorized searches of taxpayer files (apparently for no personal financial benefit).
See United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069 (1st Cir. 1997). The First Circuit found such conduct to amount to
no more than a violation of IRS work rules and emphasized that the confidential information was not disclosed to
third parties. The defendant appears to have had a vague plan to use his access to this information to assist the Klu
Klux Klan, but he never implemented his plan. Because mail fraud is an inchoate crime which even an attempt to
misappropriate confidential information can violate, this was a closer case, but one in which even the potential for
injury was not closely approached. See also cases cited infra at note 112.
101. 85 F.3d 713,722 (lst Cir. 1996).
102. Brumley has a substantial history. See 59 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 1995), withdrawn, 79 F.3d 1430 (5th Cir.
1996), aJfd 116 F.3d 728 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 625 (1997).
103. In addition to Sawyer and Brumley, recent decisions in the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have also upheld
the application of § 1346 to state officials for breach of the duty of honest services. See United States v. Bryan, 58
F.3d 933, 939-43 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Waymer, 55 F.3d 564, 572 (11th Cir. 1995).
104. See text and notes infra at notes 152-60.
105. 85 F.3d713 (lstCir. 1996).
106. Id. at 720-21.
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per year in the aggregate to state public officials by "legislative agents,"' 0 7 and a
"gratuity statute" that prohibited giving to a legislator anything of " 'substantial
value ... for or because of any official act performed or to be performed' by that
person."' 08 The evidence clearly provided a sufficient basis for the jury (which
convicted the defendant) to find violations of both statutes. On appeal, however,
the First Circuit said that the gift statute established only "a prophylactic civil
prohibition that addresse[d] appearances of-but not actual-corruption.'' 0 9
Although in context the violation of the gratuity statute would have supported the
conviction, the First Circuit concluded that the jury instructions did not permit it to
determine on which theory the jury had convicted, with the result that the
conviction had to be reversed.'

'1

More importantly, the First Circuit found that the mail fraud statute, even after
§ 1346, "does not encompass every instance of official misconduct that results in
the official's personal gain."..' Not covered, it said, was the receipt of gratuities in
connection with "non-discretionary administrative duty." ' 2 Reading § 1346
narrowly, it distinguished between a fiduciary breach and the actual deprivation of
honest services, implying that the former did not necessarily amount to the latter.
Receipt of grease payments did not necessarily violate § 1346, it concluded,
"where the conduct does not actually deprive the public of its right to [a public
3
official's] honest services, and it is not shown to intend that result." 1
Yet, the facts of Sawyer went well beyond this special exception for gratuities
paid to obtain non-discretionary services by low level officials, as the facts of the
case showed high level lobbyists wining and dining state legislators who possessed
considerable discretionary authority. Still, because the gift statute also covered
grease payments paid for non-discretionary actions and the trial court had charged
the jury that the violation of either of the two statutes could support a mail fraud
conviction, the First Circuit concluded that it was' obliged to overturn the
conviction. In the course of so doing, it emphasized clearly that "proof of a state
law violation is not required for conviction of honest services fraud,"' 14 and that
"[a] public official has an affirmative duty to disclose material information to the
public employer."' ' It summarized its understanding of § 1346 in what was
clearly a statement of federal law:

107. Id. at 726-27 (citing Mass. Gen. L. Ch. 268B, § 6).

108. Id. at 729-30 (citing Mass. Gen. L. Ch. 268A, § 3).
109. Id. at728.
110. Id. at 730-31. The First Circuit did find, however, that there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury
could find an intent to defraud to permit the case to be retried. Id. at 742.
111. Id. at 725.
112. Id. The First Circuit cited two Eighth Circuit cases-United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1026 (8th
Cir. 1978), and United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1246 (8th Cir. 1976)-for this proposition.
113. 85F.3dat725.
114. Id. at 726.
115. Id. at 724.
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When an official fails to disclose a personal interest in a matter over which she
has decision-making power, the public is deprived of its right either to
disinterested decision-making itself or, as the case may be, to6 full disclosure as
to the official's potential motivation behind an official act.1 1
This interpretation arguably exempts not only grease payments, but also influence
peddling where a legislator seeks to intervene with another public body (over
which the legislator does not have "decision-making power") to protect or favor a
constituent or special interest for undisclosed and self-interested reasons. Ironically, this was exactly the behavior involved in the Margiotta case,1 17 where the
defendant political party boss had no formal power over the county officials, but
did enjoy much influence. To be sure, Margiottacan be distinguished to the extent
that the court there charged the jury that it could find the defendant breached a
fiduciary duty to its citizens only if the defendant enjoyed a control relationship
over the state officials that he influenced." 8 But there is a fine line at best between
the facts of Margiotta and those in a case that Sawyer relied upon, United States v.
Rabbit.l"9 In Rabbitt,a state legislator "introduced" an architectural firm to "other
public officials responsible for awarding state architectural contracts, in return for
a ten percent commission on any work awarded." 1 20 In Margiotta, the county
party chairman (who was not even an elected official) instructed the County
Executive as to whom to name the county's Broker of Record (in return basically
for kickbacks to his party). 12 1 In all likelihood, the phone calls from the state
legislator in Rabbitt and the party chairman in Margiottasounded very much alike
to the public officials receiving them.
While Sawyer emphasized that a state law offense was not necessarily sufficient
to establish mail fraud, the Fifth Circuit, writing en banc, has taken the mirrorimage opposite position in United States v. Brumley, holding that a state law
violation is a necessary element of a mail fraud prosecution.12 By itself, this was a
significant reversal of prior law, which had seen the scope of mail fraud as
determined by federal common law. 123 However, Brumley also raised and left open
a potentially even more invasive inroad on the traditional law of mail and wire
fraud: whether the failure to deliver these "honest services" must amount to a
criminal offense under the relevant state law. At a minimum, Brumley indicates
that mere improperties or ethical breaches will be insufficient. "If the employee

116. Id.
117. United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982).

118. Id. at 125.
119. 583 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1978).

120. Id. at 1026.
121. Margioua, 688 E2d ati 113-14.
122. 116 F.3d 728, 733 (5th Cir. 1997) ("we decide today that the services must be owed under state law and
that the government must prove in a federal prosecution that they were in fact not delivered.").
123. See cases cited supra note 17.
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renders all services his position calls for ...[then] there has been no deprivation of

honest services."

124

The defendant in Brumley was clearly more culpable than the defendant in
Sawyer. As a hearing attorney with adjudicatory authority for the Texas Workers'
Compensation Board, defendant Brumley received loans from attorneys who had
cases before him. To this extent, the defendant in Brumley held discretionary
authority and was not a mere ministerial functionary (which was the fact pattern
that at least nominally worried the Sawyer court). Also, real benefits (not mere
gratuities in the form of drinks, meals, and rounds of golf) had been paid in
25
Brumley. 1
But these factual differences do not explain the difference in rationales. The
Sawyer holding does little to protect its defendants on a retrial (that is, a revised
indictment could simply omit the "gift" statute and rely on the "gratuity" statute).
In Brumley, although the conviction was upheld on the ground that state law had
indeed been violated by the defendant, the inroad on future cases is considerably
more substantial: in the absence of a statute (or possibly a well-established
common law rule), the defendant cannot be convicted of "honest services"
fraud. 126 Seemingly, this means that the defendant in Margiotta could not be
convicted in a future case, as no statutory violation was pled in that case and the
common law does not normally make a political party chairman a fiduciary to all
citizens of the jurisdiction.
Indeed, Brumley signals Margiottais no longer necessarily good law in another
respect. With clear intent, Brumley shifts the focus from a deprivation of the
public's right to honest services to a deprivation of the public employer's right to
such services.' 27 Under this view, § 1346 enacts not a rule of federally mandated
full disclosure to the public, but only federally mandated loyalty to the employer.
In Brumley's view, the public employer seems to be entitled to no more or less than
the private employer.
At this point, Brumley's probable overbreadth becomes discernible. If § 1346
was intended to reverse McNally and restore the intangible rights doctrine, this
interpretation of § 1346 represents only a very partial and incomplete restoration.
In addition, if § 1346 was intended to rest upon and implement the Guarantee
Clause, it cannot do so under Brumley's rationale when its very application
depends upon the existence of a state statute (or at least an established state legal

124. Brumley, 116.3d at734.
125. The defendant in fact received $86,730 in wire transfers from one such attorney. Id. at 731.
126. Of course, if there is also a provable property loss, the defendant can be convicted even under McNally
and without regard to § 1346. Only the scope of "honest services" fraud is here being assessed.
127. Brumley, 116 F.3d at 734-35 ("We pause to put aside the frequent invocations of a deprivation of citizens'
rights to honest services. The reference to such 'rights' of citizens has little relevant meaning beyond a shorthand
statement of a duty rooted in state law and owed to the state employer. Despite its rhetorical ring, the rights of
citizens to honest government have no purchase independent of rights and duties locatable in state law.")
(citations omitted).
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rule). Thus, a state wishing to escape the protections of the Guarantee Clause has
merely to repeal its relevant statute or otherwise override its prior common law.
Clearly, the Fifth Circuit was significantly influenced by the Federalist argument
that Congress should not be legislating "good government" standards for the
states. 12 Arguably, this is consistent with earlier decisions that have looked to
state law to define what constitutes a qualifying interest in "property" for purposes

of mail and wire fraud, but it is also inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Carpentert29 that seemingly defined the employee's duty to the
employer as a matter of federal law. To date, Brumley's impact outside the Fifth
Circuit seems to have been minimal. Later decisions have continued to uphold
indictments, even for simple gratuities, and have relied upon the federal common
law understanding of § 1346 as intended to restore the intangible rights doctrine.130

D. An InitialEvaluation

Factually, the leading common denominator across both the recent public and
private fiduciary cases is an aversion to criminal liability based only on the receipt
of gratuities."' But beneath this factual agreement, the two lines of cases have

disagreed as to their rationale. A frequent statement in the private fiduciary cases is
that the scope of § 1346 is far narrower in the private context than in the public
context, and at least one case has expressed doubt that § 1346 reaches private
fiduciaries when there is no deprivation of money or property.1 32 Implicit in this
consensus is a common understanding that § 1346 was intended to reverse
128. The decision expressly rejects any construction of § 1346 "as an enforcer of federal preferences of 'good
government' with attendant potential for large federal inroads into state matters ..... Id. at 735. It also cites
approvingly Brown, supra note 11. Id. at 733 n. 1.
129. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
130. See United States v. Espy, Crim. A. No. 97-0335 (RMU), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20772, at *4--6, *25,
*28, 1997 WL 795807, at *1-2, *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 1997) (upholding indictment of former Secretary of
Agriculture for undisclosed receipt of gratuities); see also United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 1998
U.S. App. LEXIS 5277 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding conviction under § 1346 where defendant schemed to defraud
corporation of right to honest services of corporate employee); United States v. Farley, No. 97 CR 0441, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17671, at *18-19, 1997 WL 695680, at *6 (N.D. I11.Oct. 31, 1997) (upholding indictment in part,
under § 1346, where defendants were charged with "ghost payrolling scheme" at county treasurer's office);
United States v. Stewart, No. Crim.A. 96-583, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16947, at *12, 1997 WL 688815, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 1997) (holding that state and citizens deprived of "honest services of its public servants who
regulate insurance companies doing business within its borders"); United States v. Bolden, No. 97 C 0218, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12252, at *13, 1997 WL 473240, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 1997) (denying motion to dismiss
indictment count because allegation could support claim that defendant used "his official position to require
payment in exchange for after-hours access to [public property] . . . and/or providing 'security' ").
131. Even this generalization is not invariably correct. In Espy, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20772, at *2, *16-28,
1997 WL 795807, at * 1, *4-8, the indictment of the former Secretary of the Agriculture was upheld based simply
on the alleged receipt of undisclosed gratuities and an alleged affirmative misrepresentation that they had not been
received.
132. See United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 441-42 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting, without defining "outer limits of
the private sector rights to 'honest services,' " that "[wihen there is no tangible harm to the victim of a private
scheme, it is hard to discern what intangible 'rights' have been violated"), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2452 (1997).
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McNally and restore the old intangible rights doctrine, which doctrine most
decisions have assumed is to be interpreted as a body of federal common law, at
least as against public fiduciaries.
In contrast, Brumley views federalism concerns as limiting the reach of § 1346
so that it only enforces duties that exist under state law. In truth, this approach may
create an even greater disparity between the public and private contexts, because
every state prohibits the bribery of public officials, 133 but many do not criminalize
commercial bribery. 134 At a stroke, Brumley also reverses the traditional preMcNally view that public officials owe a duty of disclosure to the public. In its
view, this is only rhetorical embroidery, as public employees owe their duties in
fact only to their public employer, not the citizenry. Margiotta and similar
decisions would thus seem reversed under this standard, because the defendant in
Margiottawas not a public employee and arguably owed no recognized duty under
state law to the county of which he was Republican chairman. The difference in the
formulation of the duty of disclosure under Brumley is not merely semantic. Under
Brumley, disclosure by an interested decision-maker to a board or commission that
was staffed by highly partisan members of the same political party might be
sufficient, while under earlier law a broader disclosure to the public was seemingly
required. Thus, if § 1346 was intended to mandate a federal standard of conflictsof-interest disclosure applicable to public officials, it is left in tatters after Brumley.
III. THE AVAILABLE OPTIONS: AN INVENTORY
Although recent cases show a general disinclination to treat the private and

public fiduciary identically, no single rationale or doctrinal standard runs through
these cases. In part, this is because there are problems and shortcomings with most
standards and a combination of standards may be necessary. Nonetheless, the

following concepts regularly appear in the cases and constitute an inventory of the
options available to courts:
A. Materiality

A number of courts have required that the misrepresentation or omission by the
fiduciary be material.' 35 This standard supplies an obvious means by which to
133. For a fifty state survey finding every American jurisdiction to prohibit "bribery in the public sector," see
Brown, supra note 11, at 275 & n.43 1.At least thirty eight states also had conflict of interest legislation. Id. at 275.
134, In Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 44 (1979), the Supreme Court surveyed state laws regulating
commercial bribery as of the early 1960s. It found that only fourteen states generally prohibited commercial
bribery, while another twenty-eight states had narrower statutes outlawing corrupt payments to influence private
actors in some special contexts (such as sports or banking). Although the number of states generally prohibiting
commercial bribery has probably increased, it is also likely that many states have not enacted a comprehensive
prohibition.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 665 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that § 1346 requires
showing of fraudulent intent and materiality); United States v. Mittelstaedt, 31 F.3d 1208, 1217 (2d Cir. 1994)
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exclude petty or de minimis violations. For example, take the case of an employee
who calls (via an interstate phone call) his employer to report (falsely) that he is ill
and will be taking the day off. In fact, the employee goes to a baseball game, and
the employer incurs the expense of hiring an office temporary or paying another
employee for overtime work. Although there is a misrepresentation and some
minor, but foreseeable, economic damage, it seems likely that this misrepresentation is immaterial. To this extent, a materiality standard guards against overcriminalization.
But a problem remains with this standard. What is the denominator against
which materiality is to be judged? If in Frost the defendant had arranged to award
only one academic degree for a non-existent or plagiarized research or had done so
for non-economic motives (possibly favoring a lover or family member), would
the defendant now have a materiality defense?' 36 Would a chief financial officer
who makes a several million dollar annual salary have a materiality defense about
the receipt of a $50,000 side payment to prefer one supplier over another? If so, is
this an equitable standard when the same payment to a lower paid employee would
be material? Possibly the best way out of this dilemma is to define materiality in
terms of a standard that looks to whether the disclosure by the agent of the omitted
information would have been reasonably likely to have caused the principal not1 to
37
rely on the agent's services in the transaction or to replace the agent generally.
Still, to the extent this standard permits criminal liability for side payments, it
could reverse the result in cases such as Jain or Sawyer (at least if the jury found
the nondisclosure material). Hence, although it provides some protection, a simple
materiality standard probably favors the prosecution in comparison to other
possible standards.
B. The Actual Harm Standard
Well before McNally or the passage of § 1346, the District of Columbia Circuit
in United States v. Lemiret 38 adopted the standard of whether the "defendant might
reasonably have contemplated some concrete business harm to his employer

("To be material, the information withheld must be of some independent value or must bear on the ultimate value
*ofthe transaction.").
136. Frost emphasized that a professor "owes a fiduciary duty to protect the property of his employer
university, just like any other employee." United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 367 (6th Cir. 1997). "Awarding
degrees to inept students, or to students who have not earned them," it added, "will decrease the value of degrees
in general." Id. But will this reputational injury to the University result from only a single undeserved degree, or is
it necessary to turn the department into a diploma mill (as defendant Frost seems to have done)? Professors who
have sometimes passed marginal students (as I admit having done) may read this passage in Frost with anxiety
and resolve to be more honest in the future.
137. However, in Mittelstaedt, discussed supra note 100, such a liberalized standard was rejected in favor of a
standard that required the omitted information to show the unfairness of the transaction. Mittelstaedt, 31 F.3d at
1218.
138. 720 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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stemming from his failure to disclose the conflict along with any other information
relevant to the transaction."' 1 39 Other cases in the Second Circuit and elsewhere
have used very similar language focused on whether "actual harm" occurred or
was contemplated. ' 40 A number of recent decisions have looked to this standard,
because it insulates the defendant caught in a undisclosed, but basically harmless,
conflict of interest. For example, a lawyer who has represented clients with
conflicting interests without disclosure to either is in the position of the defendant
in Bronston. But under this "actual harm" standard, the attorney would not
automatically be liable; however, the jury could convict the same defendant if it
found that he was intending to misappropriate information from one client in order
to aid the other. 4 '
Nonetheless, there are at least two problems with this standard. First, it has no
clear exception for de minimis violations. Thus, the employee in our earlier
hypothetical who falsely calls in sick to attend a baseball game may have violated
the wire fraud statute if the employee contemplated that the employer would incur
some expense or loss as a result of the employee's absence. This problem can be
corrected, however, by simply overlaying as an additional element the requirement
that a material misrepresentation or omission be made. Second, the "actual harm"
standard works relatively poorly in the case of the public fiduciary. Consider the
case of a legislator who receives a stream of payments to oppose legislation hostile
to the insurance industry. The legislator may sincerely believe that the legislation is
ill-advised, but the bribery is no less corrupt as a result. The point is simply that
"actual harm" (or any similar concept, such as "concrete business harm") does
not work in the context of public decision-making. Instead, because we cannot
meaningfully measure "harm" in this context (at least in the same concrete way
that we can in private economic transactions where there is gain or loss), conflicts
of interest and side payments need to be disclosed or forbidden as a prophylactic
matter.
C. Deprivationof Honest Services
While the "actual harm" standard predates McNally, a post-McNally route to a
similar end is to parse the language of § 1346 closely and ask whether the receipt
of a side payment, or the failure to disclose a conflict, necessarily results in a
deprivation of honest services. This focus on the services provided in fact allows

139. Id.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Von Barta, 635 E2d 999, 1006 n.14 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that § 1341 requies
actual fraud: government must show defendant's specific intent to defraud and that "some actual harm or injury
was at least contemplated); Epstein v. United States, 174 F.2d 754, 765 (6th Cir. 1949) (holding that to establish
scheme to defraud under mail fraud statute, there must be proof of actual fraud).
141. This is the holding in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), which deemed the exclusive

possession of material non-public information to be a property right (seemingly under federal common law) that
tipping by the employee deprived the employer of his right to honest services.
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the court to disregard conflicts, undisclosed interests, and side payments. A number
of recent decisions have used this route, 142 as it semantically justifies overlooking
lesser conflicts and benefits. Under this formula, if the defendant employee has
performed the same services-no more, no less-that a totally honest employee
would have provided, there has been no deprivation of honest services even if a
conflict or a side payment was not disclosed.
The problem with this theory is simply that it proves too much. Essentially, it
justifies the court in looking ex post at the terms or outcome of a transaction to
determine if the principal was fraudulently deceived by its agent. In effect, terms
that appear consistent with the market prove the agent's loyalty. Often, however, it
will be impossible to determine (with at least the requisite certainty required for
the criminal law) whether the agent could have negotiated better terms if the
agent's loyalty had not been compromised. Also, in the public context, it is seldom
possible to determine if there has been harm or a loss of services because the public
official's decision-making calculus is far more complex than that of the valuemaximizing private actor. As a result, this formula is less a test than a grant of
fairly standardless discretion to the fact-finder. Indeed, because the basic advantage in § 1346's theory of "honest services" fraud was to permit the prosecutor to
escape the constraint of having to prove a loss of money or property, this test in its
strongest form takes us back full circle to judging whether the terms of the
transaction were fair (that is, whether there was a loss of money or property). If so,
"honest services" fraud adds nothing to the prosecutor's arsenal, and this interpretation thus trivializes § 1346.
D. Violation of State Law
Brumley's requirement that there must be a state law violation has considerably
different implications for the private and public contexts. Although the Fifth
Circuit reserved the question of whether the violation had to be criminal under
state law, this issue makes a critical difference in the private context, but has
relatively little importance in the public context. In the private context, a limitation
to criminal law violations would emasculate § 1346. Although many (but far from
all) states have a commercial bribery statute, few other state criminal law norms
would apply to private business conduct. The law of agency and of fiduciary duties
has basically evolved through the common law process and has been only partially
codified in the "safe harbor" provisions that most modem corporation statutes
now set forth in order to create a mechanism by which self-dealing transactions
can be sanitized. State disclosure standards in the private context are generally
civil in character, and the great bulk of fiduciary law is similarly civil.
However, if Brumley is read to recognize the violation of a well-established
142. See e.g., United States v. DeFries, 129 F3d 1293, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Czubinski, 106
F.3d 1069, 1076-77 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728,733-34 (5th Cir. 1997).
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common law norm as a triggering event for purposes of § 1346, then the mail and
wire fraud statutes would continue to reach most private fiduciary breaches.
Virtually every state jurisdiction in the United States has civil decisions citing the
Restatement of Agency or otherwise requiring disclosure of a conflict by the agent
to the principal. To this extent, Brumley would curb the mail and wire fraud
statutes only modestly in the private fiduciary context (if non-criminal law
violations count). That is, the "corporate improprieties" cases' 4 3 and the "right to
control" cases' 4 4 would be eclipsed, because they do not rest on a true corporate
law foundation, but were rather an invention of the federal courts. Classic fiduciary
breaches, however, would remain criminal under the primary federal fraud
statutes.
In contrast, Brumley could have a devastating impact on the public fiduciary
context. To be sure, all states have a bribery statute, and to this extent Brumley
would make bribery in violation of state law a federal offense. As a practical
matter, the Travel Act already accomplishes this, assuming that a state line is
crossed.14 5 But the broader disclosure obligations set forth in Margiotta,Mandel,
and other "intangible rights" cases would be overturned, because the common law
has never developed a substantial body of precedents dealing with the disclosure
obligations of the public official. Indeed, the mail and wire fraud statutes were the
principal vehicle for the development of this law. The key idea in this now sizable
body of law is that a public decision-maker must disclose any conflict of interest in
a transaction or decision that could result in personal gain to the decision-maker. In
addition, any receipt of a gratuity may also require disclosure, at least when the
decision-maker possesses discretionary authority and the payor has an incentive to
influence the public official. 146 Because other federal statutes (such as the Hobbs
Act and the Travel Act) require proof of additional elements (such as inducement
or an expected quid pro quo),' 4 7 the acceptance of Brumley by other circuits would

143. See text and notes infra at notes 157-59.
144. See text and note infra at note 160.
145. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994).
146. This seems to be the holding in United States v. Sawyer,discussed supra note 105. United States v.Espy,
discussed supra note 131, goes marginally further and finds that undisclosed gratuities could violate the mail and
wire fraud statutes.
147. There is a continuing controversy as to whether the government must show that a payment to a public
official was made in return for a quid pro quo in order to prove a violation of the Hobbs Act. Compare McCormick
v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 274 (1991) (disagreeing with lower court's holding that "a quid pro quo is not
necessary for conviction under the Hobbs Act when an official receives a campaign contribution") with Evans v.
United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992) (holding that jury instructions satisfied quid pro quo requirement of
McCormick "because the offense is completed at the time when the public official receives a payment in return for
his agreement to perform specific official acts; fulfillment of the quid pro quo is not an element of the offense").
Most circuits have now held that the quid pro quo requirement applies to all Hobbs Act prosecutions. See
United States v. Collins, 78 F.3d 1021, 1035 (6th Cir.) (holding that quid pro quo requirement applies to all § 1951
extortion prosecutions, not just those involving campaign contributions), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 189 (1996);
United States v. Haerston, 46 F3d 361, 365 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that government must prove "quid pro quo
when it charges extortion under the color of official right"). Thus, a mail fraud theory places less of a burden of
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significantly cut back the ability of the federal government to reach state and local
corruption.
E. Does FederalismLimit Congress'sPower to Reverse McNally?
The simplest theory about the scope of mail and wire fraud is that Congress

simply reversed the decision in McNally and restored the prior, if amorphous,
intangible rights theory. There is much to support this interpretation. Language in
McNally expressly invited Congress to reverse its holding, 14 8 and § 1346, passed

in immediate response, certainly reads as if it were a congressional acceptance of
this invitation. 149 Still, even prior to McNally, many circuits had placed limits on
the broad reach of the intangible rights doctrine (as Lemire certainly shows). Thus,
restoring the old doctrine does not deny each circuit the ability to recognize

limitations that had already been accepted, such as the foregoing "actual harm"
standard.

Brumley, of course, was less concerned with Congress's intent than with
constitutional limits on federal interference with state government. The nature of
those limitations is open, however, to considerable dispute. Although in United

States v. Lopez150 the Supreme Court discovered an "internal" limitation on the
reach of the Commerce Clause, no similar limitation has yet been placed, or is
discernible, on the reach of the postal power. Instead, to invalidate the traditional
"intangible rights" doctrine, it would be necessary for the Supreme Court to

discover an "external" limitation on the postal power. 15 ' In all likelihood, some
"external" limits exist (for example, the federal government probably could not
discriminate among the states, refusing some the right to use its postal service).
Still, the bottom line issue is whether any external limit exists on the postal

power that forbids the Congress the power to define and forbid corruption at the
state and local level. Those who think so rely chiefly on New York v. United
States,1 5 2 which basically held that the federal government cannot "commandeer"
state resources. Federal anticorruption legislation does not easily offend this
proof on the prosecution than does a Hobbs Act prosecution. Bribery prosecutions (under the Travel Act) also
typically require proof of an expected quid pro quo.
148. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 361 (1987) ("[Ilt would take a much clearer indication than
the mail fraud statute evidences to convince us that having and concealing such an interest defrauds the State and
is forbidden under federal law.").
149. In United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 1997), the Sixth Circuit noted that "[every court to
address the effect of § 1346 has held that it has overruled the holding in McNally." Id. at 364 (citing cases). It
added: "We therefore hold that § 1346 has restored the mail fraud statute to its pre-McNally scope, according to
previous opinions interpreting the intangible fight to honest services." Id.; see also United States v. Czubinski,
106 F.3d 1069, 1076 (1 st Cir. 1997).
150. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
151. Again, the mail and wire fraud statutes have to be distinguished here, as the wire fraud statute and private
mailings under the mail fraud statute do rely on the Commerce Clause and are subject to Lopez's "internal"
limitations. See supra note 10.
152. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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principle, however, because it neither requires the states to do anything nor
imposes any financial burden on them. Still, language in the New York opinion
stresses the independence of the states as "neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal Government."' 153 In addition, Justice O'Connor
carefully carved out an exception in New York for legislation that "subjected a
state to the same legislation applicable to private parties," suggesting that such
legislation could more easily be upheld.' 54 Section 1346 fits easily within this
exception, because it applies to both public and private fiduciaries. Hence,
although it remains possible that the Supreme Court could expand on its earlier
decisions that insulate the states from federal interference,1 55 neither the internal
limits discovered in Lopez nor the external limits enforced in New York logically
seem to constrain § 1346 at present.
F State CorporateGovernance
Much commentary has focused on the prosecution of state public officials on the
assumption that this is the only context that triggers federalism concerns. Indeed, it
may be the most sensitive context, but it is not unique. The Supreme Court has also
presumptively allocated corporate governance to the states, unless Congress
clearly provides otherwise.' 5 6 This is not an absolute limit, and Congress can
provide otherwise by a clear statement. Thus, in both the public and private
contexts, Congress must express itself in unequivocal language if it is to recast
significantly the balance of federal/state authority.
But here a critical distinction exists between the public and private contexts.
Although § 1346 may well constitute a clear statement that public officials are to
remain subject to federal anticorruption legislation, relatively little is said about
the private fiduciary context. Indeed, no intent to override state corporate law is
expressed anywhere in that legislative history. Yet, the intangible rights doctrine
does at times do precisely that, overriding the normal rules of corporate gover-

153. Id. at 188.
154. Id. at 160.
155. The Court, however, declined the opportunity to expand these precedents in Salinas v. United States, 118
S. Ct. 469 (1997). See infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
156. Particularly in a post-Lopez environment, where the boundaries of the Commerce Clause are in dispute
(as they might be particularly in the case of the wire fraud statute), the following statement of the Court in CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics CorporationofnAmerica, 481 U.S. 69 (1987), has particular relevance:
We think the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the significance for Commerce Clause analysis
of the fact that state regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very
existence and attributes are a product of state law.
Id. at 89. This theme that corporations are "creatures of state law" runs through a string of modern Supreme Court
decisions, beginning with Cori v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), and continuing through Daily Income Fund v. Fox, 464
U.S. 523 (1984), Kamen v. Kemper FinancialServices, Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991), and culminating with Virginia
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
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nance. For example, in United States v. Weiss' 5 7 and United States v. Siegel,' 5 8 the
Second Circuit effectively created a new crime of "corporate improprieties" (as
Judge Winter said in dissent)' 59 which prohibited a subordinate corporate officer
from creating an off-books slush fund at the express instructions of the officer's
superiors. Nothing in traditional state corporate law made such conduct, without
more, a fiduciary breach. Similarly, in United States v. Wallach,160 the defendant's
characterization of his services on a bill to the corporation as being for work on an
SEC registration statement (when his services were actually that of a lobbyist) was
deemed a criminal interference with the shareholders' "right to control" corporate
funds, even though corporate management had requested this false characterization. In both cases, novel, judicially-created theories of corporate governance
displaced traditional state law rules.
Although the Supreme Court's decisions have particularly focused on the
presumptive right of the states to regulate corporate governance, the same
principles are at play when other private relationships (e.g., partnerships, trusts,
principal and agent relations, or the attorney and client relationship) are at issue.
Federal law does not generally regulate these relationships, and the discovery of a
federal rule deep within the interstices of § 1346 necessarily displaces state law. In
all these cases, there is little doubt that Congress can regulate, but it should be
subject to the same requirement that it first make a "clear statement" of its
intention to displace state law. Section 1346 does not contain any such clear
statement with regard to private fiduciaries, even if it does with regard to public
fiduciaries.
G. The UncertainImpact of the GuaranteeClause
Although the recent debate about the proper construction of § 1346 has been
dominated by the Neo-Federalists, an important counterargument has been raised
by those who believe that the Guarantee Clause 16 1 provides a source of congressional power for federal anticorruption legislation aimed at state and local
officials. 162 The starting point for this analysis is the linked propositions that (i)
there is a strong national interest in assuring public confidence in government, and
(ii) state enforcement cannot alone protect or preserve public confidence because
of the potential for state enforcement to be compromised by political loyalties.
Proponents of this view argue that inherently the Guarantee Clause commits the
federal government to altering the federal/state balance to the extent necessary to

157. 752 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1985).
158. 717 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1983).
159. Id. at 24 (Winter, J., dissenting).
160. 935 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1991).
161. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a Republican
Form of Government .... ").
162. For the fullest articulation of this view, see Kurland, supra note 20.
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preserve a Republican form of government. 163 Although the foregoing claims have
merit, the problem is that the Guarantee Clause has been more regarded by the
Court more as a shield for the states than as a sword for Congress. '64
Yet, if the Guarantee Clause alone cannot provide authority for federal legislation that would otherwise impermissibly invade some zone of sovereignty reserved
for the states,' 65 it might reinforce the power that the Congress has under the postal
power to protect § 1346 from any external limits that might otherwise be imposed
on that power. In short, if not dispositive, the Guarantee Clause may prove to be a
counterweight, particularly to the extent that external limits on enumerated powers
have so far only been imposed when the Congress seeks to "commandeer" state
resources or authority (which the federal fraud statutes do not do).
Finally, there is a more modest role for the Guarantee Clause: references to it in
the legislative history of § 1346 clearly show that federal common law is to govern
as to the scope of § 1346. In the debate over § 1346, Congressman Conyers, the
Chair of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 1 66 who introduced the bill in the
House that became § 1346,167 stressed that the proposed legislation (1) was aimed
at "state and local corruption," 68 (2) sought to overturn McNally and restore the
intangible rights doctrine, 169 and (3) relied on the Guarantee Clause and, more
specifically, Professor Kurland's article interpreting it. 7 0 Congressman Conyers in
fact reviewed the Federalist Papers in some detail to support his view, as the bill's
sponsor, that Congress had "the power to act to protect state and local governments, not only from foreign intrigues or domestic violence, but also corruption." 171 Congressman Conyers noted that the Department of Justice had appeared
at hearings before his Subcommittee to warn that "many significant prosecutions
of political corruption brought under the mail and wire fraud statutes had been
dismissed or overturned on appeal." 172
At no point in either statement, however, does Congressman Conyers discuss
private corruption or the dangers posed by fraud in the business setting. Rather, he
163. Kurland, supra note 20, at 475.
164. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,462 (1991), Justice O'Connor cited the Guarantee Clause as a basis
for state determination of the qualifications of their officials. See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
185-86 (1992) (explaining that the Guarantee Clause has role in preserving state institutions from federal
standards); Deborah J. Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Findinga Formulafor the Future, 47 VAND. L. REv.
1563, 1583-84 (1994).
165. This Article does not advance the claim that there is such a zone, but other writers do. See, e.g., Moohr,
supra note 11.
166. See 134 CONG. REc. 33,296 (Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
167. See 133 CONG. REc. 32,959-32,961 (Nov. 19, 1987) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
168. Id. at 32,959.
169. Id.
170. 134 CONG. REC. at 33,297. In addition, Congressman Conyers noted that the National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Law (the "Brown Commission") had earlier suggested reliance on the Guarantee
Clause to support anticorruption legislation aimed at state and local governments. 133 CONG. REc. at 32,959.
171. 133 CONG. REC. at 32,961.
172. 134 CONG. REC. at 33,296.
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noted that constitutional concerns had been raised about the government's "role in
prosecuting state and local corruption," and that he relied on the Guarantee Clause
to answer these problems.1 73 At most, Congressman Conyers's statement contains
a brief, indeed parenthetical, listing of the types of decisions that McNally
overturned and includes a reference to "the right of employers to the honest
services of their employees." 1 74 But this brief reference is never connected to the
purpose of the legislation or to the obstacles that needed to be overcome. The
contrast is so strong between the repeated emphasis in this legislative history of the
need to curb public corruption and this single, elliptical, string citation to a past
can fairly qualify as a "plain
case involving private corruption that only the former
75
balance.t
federal/state
the
statement" able to recast
On the Senate side, Senator Biden, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
presented the bill on the floor of the Senate and echoed both Congressman
Conyer's concerns with purging public corruption and his reliance on the Guarantee Clause:
The Constitution guarantees a republican form of government, which means
that Congress can enact statutes that make it possible to punish those who
violate the public trust at any level of government. The bill we have before us
today would reverse the McNally decision and allow Federal prosecutors to
bring the kinds of public corruption cases they were able to bring before

1987. 176
Although Senator Biden's statement contains a string citation to the kinds of cases
that could again be prosecuted, which list includes private fiduciary cases as
well,1 77 he emphasized that "[i]t is not intended to criminalize mere breaches of
fiduciary duty or private confidences or violations of the ordinary rules of the
workplace." 178 Noting that there had been some academic criticism of mail fraud's
scope, he said that the bill was "specifically limited to situations where the
defendant is acting to obtain a thing of value or to harm the organization."' 179 In
short, like Congressman Conyers, Senator Biden's focus was on public corruption,
and his comments about private fiduciaries emphasized a desire to prevent an
overbroad interpretation of the statute's reach. Neither of them suggested that the
statute would reach conduct that would not amount to a breach of duty under state
law in the case of the private fiduciary, and indeed Senator Biden insisted that
173. Id. at 33,297.
174. Id. (citing United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980)).
175. The "plain statement" reference is to Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991).
176. 134 CONG. REc. 31,072 (Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Senator Biden) (emphasis added). The reference to
"1987" in the quotation is, of course, to the year of the McNally decision.
177. Id. at 31,073 (citing cases such as United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1983); and United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1335-37 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
Lemire, of course, seems to disagree with Weiss and Siegel. See supra text and notes at notes 53-58.
178. 134 CONG. REc. at 31,073.
179. Id.
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actual harm to the organization was a necessary element.'3 0 Read closely then,
neither the Senate nor the House debate shows any intent to reject state common
law in the case of private fiduciaries.
IV. A RECOMMENDED STANDARD: DISTINGUISHING PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE FIDUCIARIES

Both for doctrinal and policy reasons, this Article has argued in favor of a sharp
distinction between public and private fiduciaries in the reach of the mail and wire
fraud statutes. On doctrinal grounds, this Article has maintained that federal
common law can still guide the interpretation of these statutes as applied to public
fiduciaries because the statutory intent of § 1346 is clear and the new principles of
Neo-federalism that are captivating the Supreme Court have stopped short of
placing state and local corruption beyond the reach of Congress. Perhaps the
clearest indication of this judicial hesitation at fully adopting the dual sovereignties position is exhibited in the Court's recent decision in Salinas v. United
States,181 in which the Court held that a prosecution of a state official for bribery
under 18 U.S.C. § 666 does not require the prosecution to prove any effect upon
federal funds, even though the statute's reach was dependent upon the state
agency's receipt of a requisite level of federal funds.' 8 2 If ever there was a case for
the Court to adopt the Neo-Federalist view that federal prosecutions for state
corruption must be restrained, Salinas seemed to present an attractive vehicle,
because it did not rest upon seldom-challenged federal powers (such as the postal
power). Nonetheless, the case declined to construe narrowly a federal statute that
seemed on its face intended only to protect the use of federal funds;.which funds on
the facts of Salinaswere never threatened. Salinas involved a small bribe (a pair of
designer watches) paid to the Sheriff of a Texas county by a prisoner in exchange
for what were euphemistically described as "contact visits" in the jail with his
girlfriend. This exchange of money for sex did not imperil federal funds (which on
the face of § 666 seems to be the primary congressional concern underlying that
statute), and thus the case seemed to provide the Court with a ripe opportunity to
extend Lopez. Still, a unanimous Court upheld the conviction and expressly
disdained the opportunity to apply either Gregory v. Ashcroft's' 83 clear statement
requirement or the principles of McNally to this context. Although the Court
reserved the issue of the statute's "applicability to intangible benefits such as

180. See supra text accompanying note 179.
181. 118 S.Ct. 469 (1997).
182. Section 666 makes ita crime for an official of a state agency that receives $10,000 or more inbenefits
under federal assistance programs to accept a bribe with the intent to be influenced or rewarded inconnection with
any agency business, transaction, or series of transactions involving anything having a value of $5,000 or more.
See 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (1994).
183. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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contact visits," 184 this seems a minor reservation, given the Court's willingness to
accept federal prosecutions of state officials for corrupt conduct that did not waste
or imperil federal funds. Conceivably, Salinas will yet prove to be a transitional
case while the Court waits for a better vehicle. Still, it shows a unanimous Court
far from eager to curb federal authority over local corruption.
Given this backdrop, this Article would propose the following standards as
consistent with both the case law and appropriate policy considerations:
1. In public fiduciary cases, the pre-McNally standards apply, and § 1346 can be
applied to the conduct of state officials who receive undisclosed financial benefits
or who have undisclosed financial interests in connection with transactions before
them. No violation of state law should be necessary (although the fact of a
violation certainly has relevance). Under this standard, the mere receipt of an
undisclosed gratuity is not exempt, but a materiality standard should apply. Thus,
decisions such as Sawyer are best viewed as cases in which the gratuities received
(i.e., meals and drinks and golf rounds) were too inconsequential to amount to a
fiduciary breach. Any broader interpretation of Sawyer (such as that an intent to
influence the decision-maker in the exercise of discretionary authority is necessary) should not be adopted or generalized.
2. In private fiduciary cases, a finding should be required that (1) state law has
been violated (although a criminal violation of state law should not be required), 85
or (2) that an independent federal statute (which also can be a civil provision) has
been transgressed, if in either case the legal rule sought to protect the beneficiaries
of the duty or duties owed by the defendant. Although this standard will result in a
non-uniform construction of the mail and wire fraud statutes across the states, the
Court has placed little value on uniformity in closely related contexts.' 86 A state or
federal law violation should not, however, be necessarily sufficient in itself; in
addition, "actual harm" to the principal or fiduciary should have been intended (or
at least reasonably foreseeable). Thus, civil law prophylactic rules are not

184. Salinas, 118 S. Ct. at 475. A decisive fact for the Court seems to have been the prisoner's status as a
federal prisoner who had been assigned to a state jail under a contractual arrangement between the county and the
federal government. Given his status as a federal prisoner, the bribery interfered with a federal program (although
protection of federal programs are not the evident concern of § 666).
185. The mail and wire fraud statutes have a very different semantic structure than the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1952 (1994), which expressly requires a criminal violation of state law to trigger its application. In contrast, the
mail and wire fraud statutes refer to a "scheme to defraud," not a state law violation. Thus, the obvious argument
is that when Congress wanted to provide that a criminal violation was necessary, it knew how to say so.
186. Both Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S.Ct. 666 (1997), and O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994),
stand for the proposition that state law, not federal law, supplies the appropriate rule of decision, even when the
non-uniformity of state law will result in some disruption for federal agencies. Only when there is a signficant
conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law will federal rules be preferred, absent a
clear congressional intent. The use of state law in the case of the mail and wire fraud statutes would not seem to
disrupt any federal regulatory program or interest (because these statutes do not seek to regulate or protect any
federal program or interest), and so a clearly expressed congressional intent to use federal common law must be

shown.
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automatically converted into a federal felony.' 87 But the state law violation need
not be a criminal one; rather, a breach of traditional state law fiduciary norms
should suffice so long as "actual harm" was foreseeable.
While the foregoing resolution can be defended as compelled by the limits
placed by the Supreme Court on the use of federal common law, normative
arguments also support this same outcome. From a normative perspective, the
following arguments stand out:
1. FairNotice. Public officials know from their earliest days that the public
expects that a "public office is a public trust." 88 Political theorists since Locke
have argued variations on the theory that governmental office is distinct from a
property right and represents power held in trust for the citizenry. 89 Thus, the
expectations held of public officials are deeply ingrained in our culture, and unfair
surprise does not result when the criminal law enforces these expectations. The
same cannot be as easily said of the private fiduciary, who generally does hold a
property interest (as a corporate shareholder or business partner) in addition to
being a representative for others and is, therefore, entitled in many instances to act
in his or her own self interest. More importantly, not only are the expectations held
of private fiduciaries less ingrained in our culture, but to the extent that private
fiduciaries seek to learn the law's commands that apply to their status, they are
likely to look primarily to state law. Hence, a requirement that state law standard or
an independent federal statute or rule be violated assures fair notice. It also protects
those persons who had little reason to know that they would be deemed fiduciaries
at all.
2. The Existence of Overlapping Statutory Duties. The public official is closely

regulated by federal criminal law, whatever the scope of the mail fraud statute.
Both the Hobbs Act' 90 and the Travel Act' 91 overlap substantially with mail fraud
(although it is true that mail fraud reaches somewhat further and imposes less of a
burden on the prosecutor). Hence, curbing the mail fraud statute as it applies to
public officials may accomplish relatively little. Ultimately, the Neo-Federalists
will not have truly won the day unless and until Congress also cuts back not only

187. In this sense, United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996), discussed supra notes 105-16, which
held that a state law violation was not necessarily sufficient, should be followed in private fiduciary cases when
the violated statute seems to have intended a purely prophylactic rule.
188. Some state constitutions actually provide that a "public office is a public trust." See FLA. CONST. art. II,
§ 8; Thomas Ross McSwain, The Sun Rises on the FloridaLegislature: The ConstitutionalAmendment on Open
Legislative Meetings, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 307, 325 n.130 (1991). The phrase was apparently first used by
Grover Cleveland (see JOHN BARTLr, FAMIIAR QUOTATIONS 532 n.3 (16th ed. 1992)) but very similar
statements can be found in the writings of persons as diverse as Edmond Burke and Thomas Jefferson. See
BARTLETT, supra at 330, 342.
189. See E. Mabry Rogers & Stephen B. Young, Public Office as a Public Trust: A Suggestion That
Impeachment for High Crimes and Misdemeanors Implies a FiduciaryStandard, 63 GEo. L.J. 1025, 1027-28
(1975).
190. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994).
191. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994).
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on mail and wire fraud, but on the Hobbs and Travel Acts and § 666 as well.' 92 It is
doubtful that the Court will follow the adherents of dual sovereignties this far.' 93 In
contrast, very few federal statutes overlap substantially with mail and wire fraud as
they apply to private fiduciaries.
3. JudicialMonitoring. In general, precise standards are superior to opaque or
fuzzy standards. But precise standards are not always possible. In the private
fiduciary context, it is possible to ask a fairly precise question: did the fiduciary's
conduct cause or threaten "actual harm"? This question can be asked because
harm can generally be measured in simple economic terms in the private fiduciary
setting. In this context, the underlying premise is that private fiduciaries are
generally expected to maximize economic value for their principals. Even in cases
that involve more than economic considerations (for example United States v.
Jain,194 where the doctor's referral to hospitals involved medical criteria as well as
economic ones), it can generally be assumed that the principal would want to
receive equivalent services at the lowest price available. In short, the world of
private fiduciaries is simplified by the assumption that, other things being equal,
the principal wants the agent to act in a wealth-maximizing fashion. Thus, if value
appears to have been maximized, the fiduciary has normally complied with his or
her duty, and the inquiry normally need not go further.
This same assumption cannot, however, be generally made in the public context.
Here, trade-offs between wealth and other values are everyday events. Hence, a
broader and necessarily stricter rule is required: a fiduciary should not accept
anything of non-trivial value from interested parties (or their affiliates or agents) in
connection with the decisions over which he or she has discretion or substantial
influence. This is a broader rule and less precise, but it is required by the
multi-factor nature of the decision-making calculus that public officials face.
4. Relative Harm. Arguably, public fiduciaries can cause greater harm and so
need a stricter rule. The conventional statement of this argument is that any act of
public corruption or self-interested behavior erodes public confidence in government and respect for the law.19 5 Of course, private corruption or self-interested
behavior in the business world also invites cynicism and a loss of confidence. At
first glance, the only difference may seem to be that more persons are generally
affected in the case of governmental corruption. But there is an additional
difference: the victims of public corruption lack any right of exit. Put simply, they
cannot change governments. But investors can change investments. Ultimately,
markets provide exit, but politics do not.' 9 6 In addition, incoming investors will
192. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
193. This is the seeming implication of Salinas v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 469 (1997). See discussion supra
notes 181-84.
194. See text and notes supra at notes 71-78.
195. For a forceful statement of this thesis, see Kurland, supra note 20, at 376-81.
196. This theme is at the heart of Professor Hirschman's famous work. See ALBERT 0. HmSciImAN, Exrr VOICE
AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE iN FIRMs, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
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buy at a reduced price to reflect the known injury and disloyalty. The point is
that markets ameliorate the loss in the case of private fiduciary abuse, and indeed
place some of the loss on those disloyal agents who are also owners. The absence
of exit or other forms of loss protection (i.e., diversification, insurance, etc.)
provides some justification for less tolerance for public corruption relative to
private corruption. Also, ugly as this truth is, sometimes private corruption
maximizes value for shareholders, and it is at least questionable whether statutes
seeking to protect shareholders should be directed against agents or fiduciaries
who act in an illegal or corrupt fashion to maximize value for their fellow
shareholders. 197
5. Selective Enforcement. The history of the mail and wire fraud statutes is a
history of constant expansion, punctuated by occasional moments of judicial
resistance and reaction. The net result is that open-ended, amorphous fraud statutes
effectively shift power to prosecutors to define new crimes, expand the net of
criminal liability, and ultimately turn the mail and wire fraud statutes into
constantly "evolving" common law crimes. This happens in both the public and
private fiduciary contexts, but more so in the latter context. Today, the private
context is populated in substantial measure by a heterogeneous catch-all of
miscellaneous defendants, united only by the bizarre character of their alleged
misbehavior.' 9 8 In theory, the common law crime, defined by judges to meet the
temper of the times, is dead,' 9 9 but in truth the reversal of McNally brought it back
from the grave.

V. CONCLUSION

No single statute can cure everything. Section 1346 attempts to address two very
different contexts at the same time. This attempt winds up distorting the development of the law in both contexts unless different standards for interpretation are
applied to these different contexts. Confining the concept of "honest services"
fraud in the case of private fiduciaries to a state law construction of "honest
services" disciplines prosecutors and restrains the runaway sprawl of judicially
made doctrine across the landscape of the private law. At the same time, construing
"honest services" fraud in the case of public fiduciaries in terms of federal
common law respects the intent of Congress and supplies a deterrent that may

197. Examples of this tendency are United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1983), and United States v.
Weiss, 752 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1985). See discussion supra note 31.
198. For those who doubt this, compare UnitedStates v. Condolon, 600 F2d 7 (4th Cir. 1979), and In re Grand
Jury Matter Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986), and answer
this question: what other federal statute could be applied in these strange and bizarre instances?
199. In principle, federal common law crimes have been prohibited since United States v.Hudson, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32 (1812), on the theory that only the legislature is entitled to specify the elements of a crime.
Historically, the meaning of "scheme to defraud" has, however, largely been determined by courts.
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otherwise be lacking to persons who already knew the expectations that the public
had of them.
Still, even clear congressional intent cannot authorize the continued "evolution" of "honest services" fraud in the public context. Both the vagueness doctrine
and the separation of powers require that judges not view themselves as authorized
by § 1346 to expand the net of criminal liability as seems appropriate from time to
time in light of the current social and political climate. To keep the doctrine
sensibly contained and to prevent § 1346 from degenerating into an impermissible
common law crime,' °° some core, fixed meaning to "honest services" fraud must
be recognized, even in the case of public fiduciaries. The core principle that is most
compatible with the history of mail fraud and the congressional intention to
overturn McNally is probably that set forth in United States v. Mandel,20 1 that a
public official must act as "trustee for the citizens and the state . .. and thus owes

the normal fiduciary duties of a trustee, e.g., honesty and loyalty" to them. 2 The
"normal fiduciary duties of a trustee" are no doubt high, but they are also constant
and defineable.
More importantly, such a standard employs a fundamentally economic
definition of what must be disclosed: namely, any economic gain, advantage or other "pecuniary benefit" received by a public official (including a party
officer) or a related person for that official's decision, opinion, recommendation,
vote or other exercise of discretion (including gratuity payments made in the
nature of a retainer for a future favorable disposition on discretionary decisions).20 3 This is broad, but far less so than an obligation to disclose all conflicts of
interest by anyone arguably characterizable as a public official. Few public
officials make important decisions without pressures and political inducements
being focused on them; it is in the nature of the job. Thus, as a prominent bar
association committee has concluded in the immediate aftermath of McNally, such
a broader disclosure
obligation "is an impossibly broad standard for the criminal
', 2 04
enforce.
to
law

200. For the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the concept of "common law crimes," see
United States v. Lanier,117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997), as well as United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
201. 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), affd in relevantpart en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979).
202. Id. at 1363. Mandel also said that the breach of duty must be linked to some "actionable fraud," which
requirement could be satisfied either by showing that the official had a "direct interest in a matter he is passing
on" or that there had been a "deliberate concealment ... to a public body, in order to receive a benefit by action of
the public body." Id. at 1364; see also United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 723 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v.
Silvano, 812 F.2d 754, 759 (1st Cir. 1987).
203. This definition basically tracks the Model Penal Code's provision on bribery. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 240.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The term "benefit" is specifically defined to exclude "an advantage
promised generally to a group or class of voters as a consequence of public measures which a candidate engages to
support or oppose." Id.
204. Committee on Criminal Law, The FederalMail FraudStatute: Analysis of the Need for New Legislation,
44 THE RECORD 264, 271 (April 1989). THE RECORD is the official publication of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York.
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The difference in scope is best illustrated with two examples:
1. The President denies that he has received a $1 million political contribution
from an official of a foreign government in return for the President's
continued support of a particular policy toward the official's country.
2. The President denies publicly at repeated press conferences that he has had
an affair with an intern and takes other steps that arguably amount to
fraudulent concealment of that relationship.
The former case is reached by this suggested interpretation, based on Mandel,
while the latter is not.2 0 5 Perhaps these hypotheticals seem too unrealistic and
far-fetched to merit serious analysis, but they reveal the gray area in the contemporary application of the mail and wire fraud statutes to public fiduciaries. Ignore this
overreach in contemporary law, and it is predictable that some future, hypothetical
special prosecutor will seek to exploit it.

205. Note that the appointment of the intern to governmental office, either in return for sexual favors or
continued silence, could be viewed as a "benefit" and even a "pecuniary benefit." However, because an unpaid
intern is not presumably a public official, the focus has to be on the receipt of a benefit by the public official so
appointing her. Arguably, the appointing public official is not receiving a "pecuniary benefit" and so falls outside
of the Model Penal Code's definition. Of course, § 1346 does not necessarily track the Model Penal Code today.

